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Comments

The President vs. Some Old Goat: The
Justiciability of War-Powers
Kazi S. Ahmed*
ABSTRACT
“Where-ever law ends, tyranny begins . . . .”
– John Locke1
The Constitution of the United States divides the nation’s war-powers
between Congress and the President. Specifically, the Constitution vests
Congress with the legislative power to declare war and the President with
the executive power to conduct war. Recently, however, the President has
dominated this constitutional framework. Congress has largely acquiesced
to the President unilaterally engaging the nation’s armed forces abroad,
and as a result, the President now has quasi-unilateral war-making
authority.
Notwithstanding the War Powers Resolution, Congressmen and
service members alike have sought judicial intervention to enjoin the
President from unilaterally engaging the nation’s armed forces. They have
argued that such unilateral engagement infringes upon both the War
* J.D. Candidate, The Pennsylvania State University, Penn State Law, 2019. I would like
to thank my family for their unconditional support. I owe them all my success. To my
friends, thank you for sticking by my side during this rollercoaster ride we call law school.
1. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 202 (1689).
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Powers Resolution and Congress’s exclusive constitutional authority to
declare war. However, courts have increasingly dismissed these suits
based upon the political question doctrine, which instructs that certain
issues are nonjusticiable because they are better left for either Congress or
the President to resolve. Consequently, courts implicitly rule in the
President’s favor when they invoke the political question doctrine because
the parties are left status quo ante.
In light of such judicial deference, this Comment will argue that
federal courts must fulfill their Article III duties and preserve the
constitutional limits of the President’s war-powers. Although such power
undoubtedly implicates political matters, the underlying issue is
fundamentally a question of constitutional law. Moreover, our government
was founded upon a democratic system of checks and balances. Therefore,
because Congress is inept to protect its war-making authority from the
President, courts must intervene and determine when the President has
exceeded the scope of his constitutional authority.
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INTRODUCTION
President George H. W. Bush once said:
Some people say, why can’t you bring the same kind of purpose and
success to the domestic scene as you did in Desert Shield and Desert
Storm? And the answer is: I didn’t have to get permission from some old
goat in the United States Congress to kick Saddam Hussein out of
Kuwait. That’s the reason.2

The Framers of the United States Constitution (the “Constitution”)
divided the nation’s war-powers between the two political branches of the
government; Congress and the President of the United States (the
“President”).3 The Constitution vests Congress with the power to declare
war, as well as the power to regulate the nation’s armed forces.4 On the
other hand, the Constitution vests the President with the role of
Commander in Chief of the nation’s armed forces.5
The textual separation of the nation’s war-powers demonstrates that
the Framers sought to curtail the nation’s ability to go to war.6 Indeed, in
a speech delivered before the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, one of
the Framers, James Wilson, advocated that the separation of war-powers
2. President George H. W. Bush, Remarks at the Texas State Republican Convention
in
Dallas,
Texas,
AM.
PRESIDENCY
PROJECT
(June
20,
1992),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=21125.
3. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11-13; see also Jesse H.
Choper, The Supreme Court and the Political Branches: Democratic Theory and Practice,
122 U. PA. L. REV. 810, 815 (1974) (noting that Congress and the President are considered
the two political branches of the government).
4. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11-13. The Constitution also vests Congress with
the power to make rules for the government and regulation of the armed forces; to organize,
arm, and govern the militia; and to call forth the militia to execute the nation’s laws,
suppress insurrections, and repel invasions. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 14-16.
5. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
6. See 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS OF THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 528 (Jonathan Elliot ed., J.B. Lippincott 2d ed. 1901) (1836)
(statement of Pennsylvania delegate James Wilson) [hereinafter DEBATES].
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was intended to deter the nation from being drawn into war unless
important national interests were at stake.7 Specifically, James Wilson
stated that:
This system will not hurry us into war; it is calculated to guard against
it. It will not be in the power of a single man, or a single body of men, to
involve us in such distress; for the important power of declaring war is
vested in [Congress]; . . . from this circumstance we may draw a certain
conclusion that nothing but our national interest can draw us into a war. 8

However, this collaborative framework, which envisioned Congress
playing a pro-active role in matters of war,9 has drastically transformed
since the Constitution’s adoption.10
In the modern era, the President is the nation’s primary decisionmaker in matters of war.11 Armed with privileged information and the
ability to act swiftly and decisively, the President often engages the
nation’s armed forces without obtaining congressional authorization.12
Thus, the President has quasi-unilateral control over whether to “draw us
into war.”13
Contrary to the Framers’ intentions, then, Congress has been forced
to adopt a diminished, secondary role in matters of war.14 Often, the
President’s unilateral actions present Congress with a fait accompli, which
forces Congress to decide whether to retroactively authorize the
President’s actions.15 However, as previously stated, the Constitution vests
Congress with the power to declare war.16 Thus, the Constitution does not
permit the President to circumvent Congress and dominate the nation’s

7. See id.
8. Id.
9. See id.
10. See Elia V. Pirozzi, The War Power and A Career-Minded Congress: Making the
Case for Legislative Reform, Congressional Term Limits, and Renewed Respect for the
Intent of the Framers, 27 SW. U. L. REV. 185, 214, 228 (1997).
11. See Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, Unilateral Action and Presidential
Power: A Theory, 29 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 850, 854-55 (1999).
12. See id.; see also John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The
Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167, 304 (1996).
13. See Moe & Howell, supra note 11, at 856; see also DEBATES, supra note 6, at 528
(statement of Pennsylvania delegate James Wilson).
14. See Moe & Howell, supra note 11, at 856.
15. Id.
16. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.

AHMED - FINAL EDITS (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

THE PRESIDENT VS. SOME OLD GOAT

12/10/2018 4:45 PM

193

war-making decisions.17 The President’s war-powers must be balanced
against those of Congress.18
Who, then, is responsible for such balancing? Some commentators
believe that the President and Congress must harmonize the issue
themselves.19 Courts share this view and frequently invoke the political
question doctrine20 to avoid hearing cases involving the allocation of warpowers.21 However, the courts’ hands-off approach prompted Congress to
pass unsound legislation,22 which resulted in even greater uncertainty
regarding the scope of the President and Congress’s war-powers.23
Accordingly, this Comment will argue that federal courts are
constitutionally responsible for balancing the nation’s war-powers
between Congress and the President.24 Courts should not invoke the
political question doctrine to dismiss a war-powers case if a complaint
alleges that the President exceeded the scope of his constitutional
authority.25
Part II of this Comment will discuss the background of the nation’s
war-powers, beginning with how the Framers intended to allocate the
nation’s war-powers between Congress and the President.26 Additionally,
Part II will discuss how the President took control over the nation’s warpowers during the Korean and Vietnam Wars,27 how Congress enacted the
17. See Yoo, supra note 12, at 264.
18. See id.
19. See id. at 305; see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.6.2 (2d
ed. 1994).
20. See Jesse Choper, Introduction to THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE AND THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 1 (Nada Mourtada-Sabbah & Bruce E. Cain eds.,
2007) (explaining that the political question doctrine is a principle stating that courts should
abstain from hearing certain constitutional issues because such issues are better left for
either Congress or the President to resolve) [hereinafter THE POLITICAL QUESTION
DOCTRINE]; see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
137, 170 (1803); Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228-29 (1993). For an in-depth
discussion regarding the political question doctrine, see infra Section III.A.
21. See Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1311 (2d. Cir. 1973) (“[T]he sharing
of Presidential and Congressional [war-powers] . . . is a bluntly political and not a judicial
question.”); Ange v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509, 514 (D.D.C. 1990) (“The powers granted to
[the President and Congress] . . . enable those branches to resolve the [war-powers] dispute
themselves.”); see also DONALD L. WESTERFIELD, WAR POWERS: THE PRESIDENT, THE
CONGRESS, AND THE QUESTION OF WAR 26 (1996).
22. See War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (2012 & Supp. 2015)).
23. See infra Section II.C.
24. See infra Part III.
25. See infra Part III.
26. See infra Section II.A.
27. See infra Section II.B.
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War Powers Resolution in response,28 and how courts have declined to
adjudicate war-power cases.29
Part III of this Comment will then analyze how courts misapply the
political question doctrine in war-power cases.30 Additionally, Part III will
propose a remedial procedure under the War Powers Resolution in which
courts may intervene in war-power cases until the Supreme Court
adjudicates the matter.31 The remedial procedure will be demonstrated
through a hypothetical scenario in which President Trump unilaterally
engages the nation’s armed forces against North Korea.32 Finally, Part IV
of this Comment will offer concluding statements on the issues above.33
II.

BACKGROUND

The Articles of Confederation (the “Articles”) was the first
constitution of the United States;34 however, it failed to adequately serve
the nation.35 One of the Articles’ main failures was that it lacked a chief
executive officer and an executive branch as a whole.36 As a result, the
Framers were prompted to draft a new constitution with a stronger federal
government.37
A.

The Framers’ Allocation of the Nation’s War-Powers

Although the Framers sought to strengthen the federal government,38
they were wary of constitutionally committing the nation’s war-powers to
a single person, or even a single body.39 Living as British colonials, the
Framers witnessed the lengthy and costly wars that the British Crown had

28. See infra Section II.C.
29. See infra Section II.D.
30. See infra Part III.
31. See infra Section III.D.
32. See infra Section III.D.1.
33. See infra Part IV.
34. See Challenges of the Articles of Confederation, KHAN ACADEMY,
https://www.khanacademy.org/humanities/ap-us-government-and-politics/foundationsof-american-democracy/challenges-of-the-articles-of-confederation/a/challenges-of-thearticles-of-confederation-article (last visited Sept. 23, 2018).
35. Id.
36. Id. (noting that an executive branch was necessary to enforce the nation’s laws
and to control the nation’s armed forces, as the legislative branch was unable to do so
independently).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See Pirozzi, supra note 10, at 207.
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conducted.40 Therefore, in order to strengthen the federal government and
simultaneously restrict its ability to go to war, the Framers created the
presidency under the new Constitution41 and divided the nation’s warpowers between Congress and the President.42
1. The Framers’ Intent
Notwithstanding the separation of war-powers, the Framers intended
Congress to remain in control over the nation’s war-making decisions.43
The power to declare war, as the Framers understood it, was the federal
government’s principal war-making instrument.44 Accordingly, the
Framers intended Congress to determine when the nation went to war45 by
vesting the nation’s representative body with the exclusive power to
declare war.46
In contrast, the President was intended to have limited policy input,
if any, in deciding whether to declare war.47 Indeed, Alexander Hamilton,
one of the Framers, emphasized the considerable limitations placed on the
President’s constitutional war-powers:
The [P]resident is to be [C]ommander in [C]hief of the [armed forces] of
the United States. In this respect his authority would be nominally the
same with that of the [K]ing of Great Britain, but in substance much
inferior to it. It would amount to nothing more than the supreme
command and direction of the [armed forces], as first general and
admiral of the [nation]: while that of the British [K]ing extends to the
declaring of war, and to the raising and regulating of [the armed forces];
all which, by the [C]onstitution . . . would appertain to [Congress]. 48

Thus, subject to a few exceptions, the President’s war-powers were limited
to directing the nation’s armed forces only after Congress had declared
40. See id.
41. See Eugene V. Rostow, Great Cases Make Bad Law: The War Powers Act, 50
TEX. L. REV. 833, 844 (1972).
42. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11-13; see also supra notes
3–4 and accompanying text.
43. See Jonathan T. Menitove, Note, Once More Unto the Breach: American War
Power and A Second Legislative Attempt to Ensure Congressional Input, 43 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 773, 778 (2010).
44. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 41 (James Madison) (“Is the power of declaring war
necessary? No man will answer this question in the negative.”).
45. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 (Alexander Hamilton).
46. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
47. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 (Alexander Hamilton).
48. Id.
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war.49 The Framers believed that this constitutional framework would
promote basic American principles such as “democratic responsibility, the
theory of checks and balances in the exercise of shared powers, and
civilian control of the military[.]”50
2. The Actual Results of the Framers’ Allocation of War-Powers
Although the separation of war-powers was intended to limit the
nation’s ability to go to war,51 over time, both Congress and the President
pushed the bounds of their respective war-powers.52 As a result, the
Framers’ conservative war-power framework developed into a liberal
one.53
a. Congressional Military Spending
For example, the Framers intended Congress to control the size of the
nation’s armed forces through the Army Clause of the Constitution.54 By
requiring Congress to renew appropriations for the nation’s armed forces
every two years, the Army Clause was meant to restrain Congress against
considerable military spending.55 However, Congress has largely failed to
use the Army Clause as the Framers intended.56
Indeed, the Framers would be surprised to learn that in 2017, the
United States spent approximately $610 billion on military expenditures.57
49. See id.; cf. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635, 668 (1862) (concluding that the President
was authorized to exercise self-defense and repel sudden attacks without obtaining prior
congressional authorization).
50. Rostow, supra note 41, at 844.
51. See DEBATES, supra note 6, at 528 (statement of Pennsylvania delegate James
Wilson).
52. See America Has Been At War 93% of the Time—222 Out of 239 Years—Since
1776, WASH.’S BLOG (Feb. 20, 2015), http://www.washingtonsblog.com/
2015/02/america-war-93-time-222-239-years-since-1776.html.
53. See id.
54. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (endowing Congress with the power “[t]o raise
and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term
than two Years”); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 26 (Alexander Hamilton).
55. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 26 (Alexander Hamilton).
56. See K.K. Rebecca Lai et al., Is America’s Military Big Enough?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/03/22/us/is-americas-military-bigenough.html (noting that the United States currently boasts one of the largest military
forces in the world with approximately 1.3 million active-duty troops and 865,000 in
reserve).
57. See Nan Tian et al., Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2017, STOCKHOLM
INT’L PEACE RESEARCH INST. (May 2018), https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/201804/sipri_fs_1805_milex_2017.pdf.; see also Lai et al., supra note 56 (noting that the next
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Additionally, the United States Senate recently passed a $700 billion
defense bill, which was $97 billion higher than what the President
originally requested.58 Accordingly, Congress’s willingness to spend
heavily on military expenditures has almost entirely circumvented the
Framers’ intent behind the Army Clause.59
b. The President’s Role as Commander in Chief
Additionally, the Framers assumed that the President’s role as
Commander in Chief “of the army and navy of the United States, and of
the militia when called into actual service” was too self-evident to warrant
a detailed discussion.60 During the nation’s early days, however, the
Supreme Court was called upon several times to define the scope of the
President’s war-powers.61
Moreover, the Framers simply brushed aside the notion that the
President could usurp Congress’s war-powers.62 The Framers concluded
that Congress would not be so “incautious” as to “vest in the [President]
permanent funds for the support of an army.” 63 However, over the course
of the Korean and Vietnam Wars, the President accomplished exactly what
the Framers believed to be improbable: the President usurped much of
Congress’s war-powers.64
B.

The President’s War-Powers Expanded During the Korean and

seven highest military-spending countries (including China, Russia, England, and France)
combined for $567 billion on military expenditures in 2015).
58. See Sheryl G. Stolberg, Senate Passes $700 Billion Pentagon Bill, More Money
Than Trump Sought, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/09/18/us/politics/senate-pentagon-spending-bill.html.
59. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 26 (Alexander Hamilton).
60. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 74 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis in original). The
Framers believed that “[t]he propriety of [the President as Commander in Chief] [was] so
evident . . . that little need[ed] [to] be said to explain or enforce it.” Id.
61. See Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. 170, 176 (1804) (concluding that the President may
not issue an executive order that supersedes or contradicts a congressional act even during
war); see also The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635, 668 (1862) (“[T]he President is not only
authorized but bound to [act in the nation’s self-defense] . . . without waiting for any
special legislative authority.”).
62. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 26 (Alexander Hamilton).
63. Id. (noting that if the President did usurp Congress’s war-powers, the Framers’
simplistically recommended that the states engage in civil war).
64. See GUIDE TO THE PRESIDENCY 639-43 (Michael Nelson ed., Routledge 2d ed.
2015) (1996); see also MARIAH ZEISBERG, WAR POWERS: THE POLITICS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY 105 (2013).
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Vietnam Wars
Prior to World War II, the President occasionally ordered small-scale
military actions without congressional authorization in order to protect
American citizens from “pirates” and “cattle rustlers” abroad.65 The
President unilaterally ordered these military actions because, due to their
limited scope, they carried little risk of escalating into significant and
prolonged combat.66 However, since the conclusion of World War II,
which was the last time the United States formally declared war, the
President has increasingly relied on his inherent Commander in Chief
powers to deploy substantial quantities of the nation’s armed forces
abroad.67 In doing so, the President has resisted seeking congressional
authorization.68 The Korean and Vietnam Wars are two examples of
situations in which the President declined to obtain congressional
authorization before committing substantial quantities of the nation’s
armed forces abroad.69
1. The Korean War
In 1950, President Truman sent over 100,000 American troops to
fight in Korea without a congressional declaration of war or express
congressional authorization.70 Throughout the Korean War, President
Truman never sought congressional authorization to engage the nation’s
armed forces in Korea, and only met with congressional leaders after
deploying armed forces in order to brief them on the developments in
Korea.71 Citing to several United Nations Security Council resolutions as
his legal authority to engage the nation’s armed forces in Korea,72

65. See JOHN C. YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11, at 12 (2005); see also H.L. POHLMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL
DEBATE IN ACTION: GOVERNMENTAL POWERS 163 (Rowman & Littlefield 2d ed. 2005)
(1995).
66. See YOO, supra note 65, at 12; see also POHLMAN, supra note 65, at 163.
67. See YOO, supra note 65, at 12; see also POHLMAN, supra note 65, at 163.
68. See Louis Fisher, The Korean War: On What Legal Basis Did Truman Act?, 89
AM. J. INT’L L. 21, 33 (1995); see also STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW
319 (6th ed. 2016).
69. See YOO, supra note 65, at 12; see also DYCUS ET AL., supra note 68, at 319.
70. See YOO, supra note 65, at 12; see also POHLMAN, supra note 65, at 163–64
(noting that the Korean War lasted three years and cost the lives of approximately 36,000
American troops).
71. See Fisher, supra note 68, at 35.
72. See S.C. Res. 82 (June 25, 1950), http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/82; S.C.
Res. 83 (June 27, 1950), http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/83.
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President Truman claimed that he was conducting “a police action under
the United Nations”73 and announced to the American public that the
United States was “not at war.”74
From a constitutional standpoint, however, the United Nations
Security Council resolutions alone were insufficient legal authority to
enable President Truman to engage the nation’s armed forces in Korea.75
President Truman required congressional authorization in addition to the
Security Council resolutions,76 but Congress did not expressly authorize
President Truman to engage the nation’s armed forces in Korea.77 Instead,
Congress acquiesced to President Truman’s decision to unilaterally
engage the nation’s armed forces in Korea.78 By acquiescing, Congress
implicitly ratified President Truman’s unilateral prosecution of the Korean
War.79 As a result, Congress opened the door for the President to usurp
control over the nation’s armed forces in the future.80
2. The Vietnam War
Shortly after the Korean War, in 1963, President Kennedy
unilaterally deployed approximately 16,500 American troops to South
Vietnam.81 The following year, President Johnson unilaterally ordered
military action against North Vietnamese targets without express
congressional authorization.82 In doing so, President Johnson relied on his
inherent Commander in Chief powers.83 The United States Department of
State issued a memorandum in support, which stated that:

73. Fisher, supra note 68, at 33-34.
74. Id. at 33.
75. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11; see also Fisher, supra note 68, at 35 (“[W]hen
[Congress] agreed to the United Nations Charter[,] [it] never agreed to supplant [the]
Constitution with the United Nations Charter. The power to declare and make war is vested
in the representatives of the people, in the Congress of the United States.”).
76. See Fisher, supra note 68, at 38.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See GUIDE TO THE PRESIDENCY, supra note 64, at 39-40.
80. See id.
81. See DYCUS ET AL., supra note 68, at 319 (noting that President Kennedy’s
deployment orders were countermeasures to a potential communist North Vietnamese
invasion).
82. Id. at 320 (noting that President Johnson’s military orders were in response to a
North Vietnamese torpedo attack on a United States destroyer).
83. See Leonard C. Meeker, The Legality of the United States Participation in the
Defense of Viet-Nam, 54 DEP’T ST. BULL. 474, 484 (1966).
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Under the Constitution, the President . . . carr[ies] very broad powers,
including the power to deploy American forces abroad and commit them
to military operations when the President deems such action necessary
to maintain the security and defense of the United States . . . without
formally consulting the Congress. . . . If the President could act in Korea
without a declaration of war, a fortiori he is empowered to do so now in
Viet-Nam.84

Notwithstanding the President’s inherent Commander in Chief
powers, President Johnson’s advisors drafted a “standby congressional
resolution,” which was intended to be the functional equivalent of a
congressional declaration of war.85 This resolution, which came to be
known as the Tonkin Gulf Resolution,86 authorized the President to “take
all necessary steps, including the use of armed force” and “all necessary
measures to prevent further aggression” in Vietnam.87
By passing a broad resolution that the President’s advisors drafted
after the President had already ordered military action, however, Congress
empowered the President to act unilaterally and seek congressional
ratification ex post facto.88 In other words, the President usurped
Congress’s war-making authority and established himself as the nation’s
primary decision-maker in matters of war.89
C.

The War Powers Resolution: Congress’s Attempt to Reclaim its
War-Making Authority

In 1973, Congress enacted the War Powers Resolution in response to
the President’s expanded war-making authority.90 The War Powers
Resolution, which is still in effect, modifies the President’s war-powers in
three main ways.91 First, the President can only engage the nation’s armed
forces pursuant to “(1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory
authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by [an] attack upon the
84. Id. at 484-85, 488.
85. See DYCUS ET AL., supra note 68, at 320.
86. Tonkin Gulf Resolution, Pub. L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384 (1964).
87. Id.
88. See GUIDE TO THE PRESIDENCY, supra note 64, at 639-43; see also ZEISBERG, supra
note 64, at 105.
89. See GUIDE TO THE PRESIDENCY, supra note 64, at 639-43; see also ZEISBERG, supra
note 64, at 105.
90. See War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (2012 & Supp. 2015)); see also DYCUS ET AL., supra
note 68, at 349.
91. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541, 1543-44.
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United States . . . .”92 Second, the President is required to submit various
reports to Congress once he engages the nation’s armed forces abroad.93
Third, the President is given a 60-day window in which he can engage the
nation’s armed forces without express congressional authorization.94
The War Powers Resolution was intended “to give Congress both the
knowledge and the mechanism needed to reclaim its constitutional power
to declare war” and to “assure that [Congress be involved] in any future
decision to commit the United States to [war] . . . .”95 However, no
President has accepted the War Powers Resolution’s constitutionality nor
fully complied with its provisions.96 Likewise, many scholars believe that
the War Powers Resolution is prima facie unconstitutional.97 Although
various proposals have been made to amend or repeal the War Powers
Resolution, none have been passed thus far.98
D.

The Courts’ Stance on War-Power Cases

More than 40 years after its enactment, the War Powers Resolution’s
legal and practical effects remain in a state of uncertainty.99 A main reason
for this uncertainty is that courts decline to adjudicate cases involving the
allocation of war-powers.100 In order to dismiss such cases, courts
frequently invoke the political question doctrine,101 which is a principle
stating that courts should abstain from hearing certain constitutional issues
because such issues are better left for either Congress or the President to
92. Id. § 1541.
93. See id. § 1543 (requiring the President to submit written reports to Congress
detailing the need for military action and the action’s status).
94. See id. § 1544. Following this 60-day window, if Congress does not specifically
ratify the President’s military action, either statutorily or by declaration of war, the
President is subsequently required to withdraw the armed forces on his own accord, or if
Congress so directs by concurrent resolution. Id.
95. Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893, 899 (D.D.C. 1982).
96. See RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33532, WAR POWERS
RESOLUTION:
PRESIDENTIAL
COMPLIANCE
2
(2007),
https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=712150.
97. See DYCUS ET AL., supra note 68, at 349, 354-55; see also Stephen L. Carter, The
Constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution, 70 VA. L. REV. 101, 119 (1984)
(explaining that the War Powers Resolution is unconstitutional because it automatically
suspends the President’s executive authorities after 60 days without affirmative
congressional legislation).
98. See GRIMMETT, supra note 96, Summary.
99. See DYCUS ET AL., supra note 68, at 349.
100. See WESTERFIELD, supra note 21, at 26.
101. See Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333, 340 (D.D.C. 1987); Crockett v. Reagan,
558 F. Supp. 893, 898 (D.D.C. 1982); see also WESTERFIELD, supra note 21, at 26.
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resolve.102 As one court reasoned, “[m]eddling by the judicial branch in
determining the allocation of constitutional [war-]powers . . . ‘extends
judicial power beyond the limits inherent in the constitutional scheme for
dividing federal power.’”103
However, the nation has deviated from the Framers’ intended
division of war-powers.104 The Framers intended Congress to be the
nation’s primary decision-maker regarding matters of war,105 but instead,
the President usurped Congress’s war-making authority over the course of
the Korean and Vietnam Wars.106 Subsequently, Congress enacted the War
Powers Resolution to reclaim its war-making authority,107 though the
resolution’s legal effects are unclear because courts decline to adjudicate
war-power cases.108
As a co-equal branch of the government,109 however, courts must
review the President’s military actions in order to determine whether such
actions are consistent with both congressional legislation and the
Constitution. Otherwise, the President will continue to expand his warpowers at the expense of Congress’s.110 As one scholar notes, “[j]udicial
deference ignores the evident truth that in our system a law that is not
enforceable by adjudicatory process is no law at all.”111 Our democratic
system of checks and balances tolerates no less.112
III. ANALYSIS
Article III of the Constitution provides courts with judicial power that
extends to all cases and controversies arising under the Constitution,
federal law, and treaties.113 However, Article III is curiously silent on

102. See THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE, supra note 20, at 1.
103. Ange v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509, 514 (D.D.C. 1990) (quoting Riegle v. Fed. Open
Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d 873, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
104. See supra Section II.A.
105. See supra Section II.A.
106. See supra Section II.B.
107. See supra Section II.C.
108. See WESTERFIELD, supra note 21, at 26.
109. See Michael Gonchar, Teaching and Learning About Governmental Checks and
Balances and the Trump Administration, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2017),
https://nyti.ms/2wWM7t1.
110. See Moe & Howell, supra note 11, at 855.
111. THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS JUDICIAL ANSWERS: DOES THE RULE
OF LAW APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS? 8 (1992).
112. See Gonchar, supra note 109.
113. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
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inter-branch disputes.114 Specifically, Article III does not expressly grant
or deny courts jurisdiction to resolve disputes regarding the allocation of
shared constitutional powers between Congress and the President, such as
war-powers.115 Because there is little evidence of the Framers intent
regarding such issues, courts have been forced into a self-defining role
through employment of the common law.116
Chief Justice Marshall’s renowned maxim in Marbury v. Madison,117
that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department
to say what the law is[,]” suggests that courts have a fundamental duty to
resolve unsettled questions of law.118 In the same opinion, however, Chief
Justice Marshall stated that some issues are political in nature, and
therefore, cannot be judicially resolved.119 This begs the inquiry: When is
a question purely political? Or, more specifically: Is the allocation of warpowers a purely political question? Unfortunately, because the answers to
these questions are unclear, courts have been historically inconsistent in
determining whether the allocation of war-powers is purely political in
nature, and thus, nonjusticiable.120
A.

The Political Question Doctrine Was Intended to be Narrow

As previously stated, the political question doctrine is a principle
under which courts abstain from hearing constitutional issues on the
ground that such issues are better left for either Congress or the President
to resolve.121 The political question doctrine’s roots can be traced back to
Marbury, in which Chief Justice Marshall stated:
The province of the court is . . . not to enquire how the [President], or
[the President’s] officers, perform duties in which they have . . .

114. Id.
115. Id.; see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 463 (4th Cir. 2003) (“Article III
contains nothing analogous to the specific powers of war carefully enumerated in Articles
I and II.”).
116. See DYCUS ET AL., supra note 68, at 135-36.
117. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
118. See id. at 177.
119. Id. at 170.
120. Compare Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 614 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (“[W]e see [no]
difficulty in a court facing up to the question as to whether . . . the President is or was
without power to continue [a] war without [c]ongressional approval.”), with Ange v. Bush,
752 F. Supp. 509, 514 (D.D.C. 1990) (“The powers granted to [the President and Congress]
enable [them] to resolve the [war-powers] dispute themselves.”).
121. See THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE, supra note 20, at 1; see also supra
Section II.D.
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discretion. Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by the
[C]onstitution and laws, submitted to the [President], can never be made
in this court.122

The issue in Marbury was whether President Adams’s decision to
appoint a federal judge during his final days as the President was lawful.123
However, because the Constitution vests the President with the exclusive
discretion to appoint federal judges,124 Chief Justice Marshall concluded
that courts could not intervene when the President exercised such
discretion.125 Thus, Chief Justice Marshall’s conclusion implies that the
political question doctrine was intended to be invoked under limited
circumstances in which the Constitution vests the President with exclusive
discretion.126
However, in Baker v. Carr,127 Justice Brennan formulated an
expansive test that courts could apply to invoke the political question
doctrine.128 Justice Brennan found that a nonjusticiable political question
arose when there was a “textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department[] or a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving [the
issue].”129 Subsequently, courts invoked the political question doctrine
liberally in war-power cases on the ground that such cases satisfied the
Baker test.130 The courts concluded that (1) the Constitution textually
committed the nation’s war-powers to Congress and the President,131 and

122. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 170.
123. Id. at 155.
124. See U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2.
125. See Marbury, 5 U.S. at 170.
126. See id. at 165-66 (“[T]he President is invested with certain important political
powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his own discretion, and is accountable only to
his country in his political character, and to his own conscience.”).
127. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
128. Id. at 217.
129. Id. Justice Brennan also found that nonjusticiable political questions arose when
the court was asked to make nonjudicial policy determinations; when the court’s decision
would disrespect or embarrass the other branches of the government; and when there was
an unusual need to abide by a prior political decision. Id. However, most courts do not
analyze these additional factors when applying the test to invoke the political question
doctrine. See DYCUS ET AL., supra note 68, at 139.
130. See THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE, supra note 20, at 130.
131. See Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1311 (2d. Cir. 1973); see also Ange
v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509, 514 (D.D.C. 1990); Sadowski v. Bush, 293 F. Supp. 2d 15, 21
(D.D.C. 2003).
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that (2) there were no judicially discoverable and manageable standards
for resolving war-power cases.132
B.

Courts Misapply the Political Question Doctrine in War-Power
Cases

Although courts have applied the Baker test liberally to dismiss warpower cases,133 Justice Brennan emphasized the distinction between
“political questions” and “political cases.”134 Specifically, Justice Brennan
stated that “it is error to suppose that every case or controversy which
touches [political matters] lies beyond judicial cognizance.”135 Further,
Justice Brennan stated that the political question doctrine could not be
invoked to dismiss “a bona fide controversy as to whether some action
denominated ‘political’ exceed[ed] constitutional authority.”136
Therefore, according to Justice Brennan, courts cannot invoke the
political question doctrine simply because a case implicates sensitive
political judgments, foreign affairs, or military actions.137 Rather, a court’s
decision on whether to invoke the political question doctrine must depend
on the legal issue presented.138 Accordingly, courts should not invoke the
political question doctrine when the legal issue presented is whether the
President’s military action has exceeded the scope of his constitutional
authority.139
1. Courts Confuse the Legal Issue Presented in War-Powers Cases
Despite Justice Brennan’s instructions in Baker, courts often confuse
the legal issues in war-power cases and focus instead on the cases’ political
consequences.140 Moreover, courts are aware that they may not have the

132. See Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333, 340 n.53 (D.D.C. 1987); see also
Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 24-25 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Silberman, J., concurring);
Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893, 898 (D.D.C. 1982).
133. See THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE, supra note 20, at 130.
134. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See DYCUS ET AL., supra note 68, at 142.
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See Ange v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509, 518 n.8 (D.D.C. 1990); see also Sadowski v.
Bush, 293 F. Supp. 2d. 15, 20-21 (D.D.C. 2003) (“[Plaintiff] is asking the Court to
determine whether President Bush’s decision to go to war against Iraq was proper.”).
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necessary expertise to review the President’s military actions.141
Unsurprisingly then, courts often invoke the political question doctrine to
dismiss war-power cases because they believe that they are being asked to
substitute the President’s judgment with their own judgment.142
For example, in Ange v. Bush,143 the court dealt squarely with the
Constitution’s allocation of war-powers between Congress and the
President.144 In Ange, President H. W. Bush issued deployment orders to
the Persian Gulf without congressional authorization.145 One of the
soldiers who received the orders sued President H. W. Bush on the grounds
that the President had violated the War Powers Resolution and infringed
upon Congress’s exclusive authority to declare war.146 Instead of hearing
the case, the court invoked the political question doctrine and stated that
“[i]n this court’s view, . . . the decision as to whether to deploy United
States troops is not a judicial function.”147
As evidenced by the court’s statement, however, the court incorrectly
assumed that it was asked to determine whether the decision to deploy
troops was proper. Rather, the legal issue presented was whether the
President had exceeded the scope of his constitutional authority when he
issued deployment orders without congressional authorization.148
According to Baker, courts cannot invoke the political question doctrine
to dismiss a case when the legal issue presented is whether Congress or
the President exceeded their respective constitutional authority.149
Therefore, had the court not confused the legal issue presented, it could
have properly exercised its “judicial function” to determine whether
President H. W. Bush had exceeded the scope of his constitutional
authority when he issued deployment orders to the Persian Gulf without
congressional authorization.150
141. See Taylor v. Dep’t of the Army, 684 F.2d 99, 109 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“In view of
the knowledge, experience and positions held by [government officials] regarding military
secrets, military planning and national security, [the government is] entitled to ‘the utmost
deference.’”); see also DYCUS ET AL., supra note 68, at 137.
142. See Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see also DYCUS ET AL.,
supra note 68, at 137.
143. Ange v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509 (D.D.C. 1990).
144. See id. at 512.
145. See id. at 511-12.
146. See id. (noting that the plaintiff sued the President on the ground that the President
failed to obtain congressional authorization to issue such deployment orders).
147. Id. at 518 n.8.
148. See id. at 511-12; see also DYCUS ET AL., supra note 68, at 143.
149. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
150. See id.; see also Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 40-41 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Tatel,
J., concurring) (noting that the legal issue presented as to “whether the President possessed
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Judicially Discoverable and Manageable Standards Exist to
Resolve War-Power Cases

Even when courts correctly identify the legal issues presented in warpower cases, they often claim that there are no judicially discoverable and
manageable standards to resolve such cases.151 Specifically, courts claim
that judicial standards or definitions do not exist to determine whether
certain military actions constitute “hostilities” or “war.”152 Without such
judicial standards or definitions, courts claim that they are unable to
conclude whether the President’s military actions infringed upon
Congress’s exclusive power to declare war, and thus, amounted to a
constitutional violation.153
However, such reasoning is flawed for two reasons. First, Justice
Jackson’s renowned concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer154 provides a workable framework under which war-power cases
can be analyzed. Second, the President’s military actions are “no more
standardless than any other question regarding the constitutionality of
government action[,]” and therefore, courts can develop standards just as
they have done for many other constitutional issues.155
1. Justice Jackson’s Three-Category Framework
In Youngstown, Justice Jackson recognized that the President’s
powers “are not fixed[,] but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or
conjunction with [Congress’s powers].”156 Justice Jackson then identified
three categories under which the President’s actions could be analyzed to

legal authority to conduct [certain] military operation[s] . . . [required the courts] to
perform one of the most important functions of Article III courts: determining the proper
constitutional allocation of power among the branches of government.”); Mitchell v. Laird,
488 F.2d 611, 614 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (“[W]e see [no] difficulty in a court facing up to the
question as to whether . . . the President is or was without power to continue [a] war without
Congressional approval.”).
151. See Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333, 340 n.53 (D.D.C. 1987); see also Crockett
v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893, 898 (D.D.C. 1982); Campbell, 203 F.3d at 24-25 (Silberman,
J., concurring).
152. See Lowry, 676 F. Supp. at 340 n.53; see also Campbell, 203 F.3d at 24-25
(Silberman, J., concurring); Crockett, 558 F. Supp. at 898.
153. See Campbell, 203 F.3d at 25 (Silberman, J., concurring); see also Crockett, 558
F. Supp. at 899.
154. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
155. Campbell, 203 F.3d at 37 (Tatel, J., concurring).
156. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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determine whether such actions were constitutional.157 In the first
category, the President has maximum authority when he acts pursuant to
express or implied congressional authorization.158 Under this category, the
President’s actions are afforded “the strongest of presumptions and the
widest latitude of judicial interpretation.”159
In the second category, the President operates in a “zone of twilight”
when he has concurrent authority with Congress over a matter, such as
war.160 Under this category, if Congress fails to grant or deny the President
certain authority, then the President may act pursuant to his own
independent constitutional authority.161 Thus, “congressional inertia,
indifference or [ac]quiescence” may establish a constitutionally valid basis
upon which the President can act independently.162
Finally, in the third category, the President’s power “is at its lowest
ebb” when he acts against Congress’s express or implied will.163 Under
this category, Congress’s constitutional powers supersede the President’s
unless the Constitution expressly affords the President exclusive discretion
over the matter.164 Thus, the President’s powers “are in the least
favorable . . . constitutional posture[]” and “are most vulnerable to attack”
when they are analyzed under the third category.165
In Youngstown, Justice Jackson used this three-category framework
to determine that President Harry Truman had exceeded the scope of his
constitutional authority.166 President Truman claimed that he had acted
pursuant to his Commander in Chief powers when he issued an order
directing his agents to seize the nation’s steel mills.167 However, Justice
Jackson found that Congress had already passed legislation that was
inconsistent with President Truman’s seizure.168 Thus, Justice Jackson
analyzed President Truman’s seizure under the third category and found
that President Truman exceeded the scope of his constitutional authority

157. Id. at 635-38.
158. Id. at 635-37.
159. Id.
160. See id. at 637; see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11-13.
161. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 637-38.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 640.
166. Id. at 637-55.
167. Id. at 583-84 (majority opinion) (noting that President Truman ordered the seizure
to ensure that the government had enough steel to prosecute the Korean War).
168. Id. at 639 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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because the Constitution did not expressly vest the President with the
exclusive power to seize private property.169
Accordingly, Justice Jackson’s three-category framework is well
suited to resolve war-power cases because it provides a standard under
which the President’s constitutional powers can be balanced against
Congress’s.170 The Constitution requires that Congress and the President
cooperate in matters of war,171 and thus, the President’s military actions
will necessarily fall under one of Justice Jackson’s three categories.172 In
all likelihood, most war-power cases will not fall under the first category
because war-power disputes are less likely to occur when Congress and
the President act harmoniously.173 Therefore, most war-power cases will
fall under the second or third categories.174
Under the second category, courts can evaluate whether the
President’s military actions were facilitated based upon congressional
acquiescence, such as during the Korean and Vietnam Wars.175 If so, then
the President’s military actions would be deemed constitutional.176
Likewise, under the third category, courts can evaluate whether the
President’s military actions were contrary to Congress’s express or
implied will.177 If so, then the President’s military actions would be
deemed unconstitutional.178
2. Courts Can Develop Standards to Resolve War-Power Cases
Notwithstanding Justice Jackson’s three-category framework, courts
have claimed that they are ill-equipped to determine whether certain
military actions constitute “hostilities” or “war.”179 However, not only are
courts capable of determining when the nation is at war, they are also
capable of developing standards to resolve war-power cases.180 As Judge
Tatel stated:
169. Id. at 640, 653.
170. See id. at 635-38.
171. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11-13; see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
172. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635-638 (Jackson, J., concurring).
173. See DYCUS ET AL., supra note 68, at 46.
174. See id. at 47-50.
175. See supra Section II.B.
176. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
177. See id. at 637-38.
178. See id.
179. See Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333, 340 n.53 (D.D.C. 1987); see also
Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 24-25 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Silberman, J., concurring);
Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893, 898 (D.D.C. 1982).
180. See Campbell, 203 F.3d at 37-40 (Tatel, J., concurring).
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I do not agree that courts lack judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for “determining the existence of a ‘war.’” . . . Whether
[certain] military activity . . . amount[s] to “war” within the meaning of
the [Constitution] is no more standardless than any other question
regarding the constitutionality of government action. Precisely what
police conduct violates the Fourth Amendment [protection] “against
unreasonable searches and seizures?” When does government action
amount to “an establishment of religion” prohibited by the First
Amendment? When is an election district so bizarrely shaped as to
violate the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of “equal protection of the
laws?” Because such constitutional terms are not self[-]defining,
standards for answering these questions have evolved, as legal standards
always do, through years of judicial decision[-]making.181

Indeed, the Supreme Court has determined whether the nation was at
war in order to resolve war-power cases on several occasions.182 For
example, in Bas v. Tingy,183 the Supreme Court determined that the nation
was at war with France, even though Congress had not expressly declared
so.184 The Court found that the nation’s aggressions with France were
sufficient to constitute a war because Congress had built warships,
dissolved the nation’s treaty with France, and passed several statutes that
authorized American citizens to use naval force against French vessels.185
Similarly, in The Prize Cases,186 the Supreme Court determined that
President Lincoln’s naval blockade of Confederate ports during the Civil
War was “itself official and conclusive evidence . . . that a state of war
existed.”187 The Supreme Court then interpreted the Constitution and
determined that the President could exercise self-defense and repel sudden
attacks without waiting for congressional authorization.188
In more recent cases, courts have taken judicial notice that the
President’s military actions could be of “such magnitude and significance
as to present no serious claim that a war would not ensue if [the armed

181. Id.
182. See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635, 670 (1862); see also Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. 37,
41 (1800); Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. 1, 44-45 (1801).
183. Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. 37 (1800).
184. Id. at 41.
185. Id.
186. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635 (1862).
187. Id. at 670.
188. Id. at 668.
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forces] became engaged in combat.”189 For example, in Dellums v. Bush,190
President H. W. Bush deployed approximately 230,000 troops to the
Persian Gulf without congressional authorization.191 Moreover, President
H. W. Bush had obtained authorization from the United Nations Security
Council to use military force against Iraq.192 Under these circumstances,
the court concluded that “an offensive entry into Iraq by several hundred
thousand United States servicemen” would undoubtedly constitute a war
that required congressional authorization.193 Similarly, in Mitchell v.
Laird,194 the court concluded that the nation’s hostilities in Vietnam
constituted a war that required congressional authorization because the
nation had suffered hundreds of thousands of casualties, spent billions of
dollars to prosecute the armed conflict, and President Nixon had used the
word “war” during his Inaugural Address.195
Furthermore, courts have taken judicial notice that certain military
actions amounted to war in contexts other than war-power cases, such as
contract claims.196 Thus, courts are capable of developing standards to
determine when the nation is at war in order to resolve war-power cases.197
Although such determinations would be more difficult in situations where
limited military force is used, Judge Tatel recognized that courts do not
refrain from deciding First Amendment cases “simply because [they] can
imagine a more difficult [case].”198 Therefore, the fact that a case’s subject
matter involves a complex military action does “not justify abdicating [a
court’s] responsibility to construe the law and apply it to the facts of [the]
case.”199

189. Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1145 (D.D.C. 1990); see also Mitchell v.
Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 614 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
190. Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990).
191. Id. at 1146.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
195. Id. at 614.
196. See Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d at 39 (Tatel, J., concurring); see also W.
Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Meadows, 261 S.W.2d 554, 559 (Tex. 1953) (“[T]o deny that the
Korean military action is not war in its popularly accepted meaning is to deny the evidence
of one’s senses.”) (quoting Beley v. Pa. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 95 A.2d 202, 213 (Pa. 1953));
Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1334 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[N]o one can doubt that a
state of war existed when our armed forces marched first into Kuwait and then into Iraq.”).
197. See Campbell, 203 F.3d at 37-40 (Tatel, J., concurring).
198. Id. at 40.
199. Id.

AHMED - FINAL EDITS (DO NOT DELETE)

212

D.

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

12/10/2018 4:45 PM

[Vol. 123:1

Recommendation

The Supreme Court should ultimately rule that war-power cases are
justiciable. Further, the Supreme Court should either adopt Justice
Jackson’s three-category framework or create its own standard under
which courts can adjudicate war-power cases.200 However, until the
Supreme Court rules on this matter, courts should not invoke the political
question doctrine in war-power cases. Instead, courts should allow
Congress to seek injunctive relief under the War Powers Resolution if the
President continues to order military action after the 60-day window
expires.201 Providing judicial relief at this juncture would not only permit
the President to order military action within the 60-day window, as
prescribed by the War Powers Resolution, it would also provide Congress
with a remedy if it failed to pass legislation after the 60-day window
expired.202 To demonstrate this remedial procedure, a hypothetical
scenario will be presented in which President Trump unilaterally orders
military action against North Korea.
1. If President Trump Unilaterally Ordered Military Action Against
North Korea
Recently, Kim Jong-un has vowed to denuclearize North Korea.203
However, less than one year ago, Kim Jong-un and North Korea posed a
serious threat to the United States.204 Specifically, Kim Jong-un threatened
that North Korea had nuclear warheads that were capable of reaching our
nation’s mainland.205 In response, President Trump stated that further
North Korean threats to our nation would be met with “fire and fury.” 206
Such exchanges between Kim Jong-un and President Trump serve as a
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reminder that North Korea and its active nuclear program remain an
ongoing threat to the United States.207
Assuming, then, that denuclearization talks between the United
States and North Korea break down and hostilities resurface between the
two nations, President Trump may decide to strike first and unilaterally
order non-nuclear military action against North Korea. If President Trump
ordered such military action against North Korea, he would have to submit
a written report to Congress pursuant to the War Powers Resolution.208
Once President Trump submitted a written report to Congress, the 60-day
window would begin to run in which President Trump could order military
action against North Korea without express congressional authorization.209
During the 60-day window, Congress would deliberate as to whether to
endorse President Trump’s military action against North Korea or
terminate it.210
In the event that Congress decided to terminate President Trump’s
military action against North Korea, however, President Trump could still
lawfully veto Congress’s proposed legislation.211 Thus, under this
Comment’s remedial procedure, Congress could avoid a potential veto and
sue President Trump if he continued to order military action against North
Korea after the 60-day window expired. Notwithstanding other procedural
requirements, a court could then enjoin President Trump’s military action
and provide Congress with expeditious relief if it determined that
President Trump exceeded the scope of his constitutional authority. A
court-ordered injunction would give Congress the ability to reclaim its
war-making authority and participate in matters of war as the Framers had
originally intended. Such a remedial procedure would also provide the
War Powers Resolution with a manageable framework that has been
lacking since its passage.
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208. See War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified as
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Constitution requires that Congress and the President cooperate
in matters of war.212 Although the President was vested with the power of
Commander in Chief of the nation’s armed forces, the Framers intended
Congress to have the exclusive power to decide whether the nation should
go to war.213 Over the course of the Korean and Vietnam Wars, however,
the President established himself as the nation’s primary decision-maker
in matters of war.214 Notwithstanding the War Powers Resolution,
Congress has been unable to reclaim its war-making authority.215
In response to these developments, courts have decided to take a
hands-off approach.216 When presented with cases involving the allocation
of the nation’s war-powers, courts have frequently invoked the political
question doctrine to dismiss such cases.217 However, many war-power
cases present justiciable issues.218 Further, judicially discoverable and
manageable standards exist to resolve war-power cases.219 Therefore,
courts should fulfill their Article III duties and adjudicate war-power cases
if the legal issue presented is whether the President exceeded the scope of
his constitutional authority. After all, in order to preserve our nation’s
democratic principles of checks and balances, “[c]ourts [must] be last, not
first, to give them up.”220
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